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1. Introduction  
 In early September 1945, following the end of World War II, about a dozen 
correspondents from the major American media visited several Japanese cities, 
including atomic-bomb-blasted Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Limited accounts 1  and 
personal papers2 reveal that they were members of a press tour, organized as part of 
publicity campaign by the Army Air Forces (AAF) dubbed “STINKO Project,”3 which 
was aimed at featuring the roles the AAF had played in bringing about Japan’s 
capitulation. The AAF hoped that the coverage would help ensure their independence 
from the Army in the postwar reorganization of the US armed forces.4   
In addition to the correspondents from major newspapers, news agencies and 
broadcasting companies, the press tour also included the staff of the military’s public 
relations wings—such as writers of Army’s Yank magazine and cameramen from AAF’s 
motion picture unit.  One of them was Lieutenant Colonel Daniel A. McGovern, who 
later led the Motion Picture Project of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
(USSBS), an authoritative commission consisting of more than 1,000 civilians and 
                                                     
1 Craven and Cate, eds., 733; Major Ben Z. Kaplan, “Nippon Diary: tojo [sic] doesn’t live here any more,” 
Free World (Dec. 1945), 33.  
2 For example, see the Vern Haugland Papers at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Library, University of 
Montana at Missoula. Haugland was a correspondent for the Associated Press (AP). Other members of the press tour 
included Clark Lee of International News Service (INS), James McGlincy of the United Press (UP), Guthrie Janssen 
of NBC, Bill Downs of CBS, Bernard Hoffman of Life magazine, John Bockhorst of MGM “News of the Day,” 
Stanley Troutman of Acme Newspictures, William H. Lawrence of the New York Times, Homer Bigart of the New 
York Herald Tribune, Frederick Opper of ABC and Bob Brumby of MBS.  See, Shigesawa, 2010. 
3 It is unknown whether this is an abbreviation and if so, what it stands for. 
4 Shigesawa, 2010, 20-23, 162-165. 
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military personnel that evaluated the effects of the strategic bombing during World War 
II.5  
The USSBS Motion Picture Project is known for two films—a 160-minute 
black-and-white Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki6 shot and 
edited by Nippon Eiga Sha (“Nichiei” in short), a Japanese film unit, and the collection 
of 85,000 feet of color film shot of various scenes and events across cities in Japan by 
American cameramen. About one third of this color footage was taken in either 
Hiroshima or Nagasaki.7 These films have, after buried in obscurity for a quarter of a 
century, been appropriated by or converted into numerous documentaries and nuclear 
holocaust fictions, as they have been almost the only motion picture materials that 
captured the horror of the nuclear attacks. It is certainly hard to imagine how those 
documentaries and the fictional films could have been done without this footage.  
Many of the preceding studies of the USSBS atomic bomb films focus on the 
suppression these films had undergone.8 While the USSBS Motion Picture Project has 
been taken for granted as a presupposed operation, historians rarely delve into why and 
how this method of recording—not used in the USSBS European survey—was 
introduced in the Pacific survey.9  
In this essay, the author attempts to explore the history that brought about the 
STINKO Project, which eventually evolved into the USSBS Motion Picture Project.  
She then sheds light on the purpose and roles for which these projects were intended, as 
well as on the background of the films’ suppression. 
Motion pictures have been used since before World War II not only as a way to 
record battles, but also for publicity to recruit volunteers and as a tool to train those 
inducted. In the US during the war, making films had become a huge undertaking for 
armed forces as they competed with each other and the motion picture industry in 
Hollywood cooperated with the military to produce hundreds of films.10  
                                                     
5 “Forward,” USSBS, Summary Reports (European War & Pacific War), ii; Daniels, ed., xxi-xxvi. 
6 The entire film, consisting of 19 reels (local identifier: 342-USAF-17679), can be viewed online at the web 
site of the National Archives (hereafter, NARA).  
7 Analysis by the author. There are 90 reels of USSBS color footage (local identifiers: 342-USAF-11000 to 
342-USAF-11088, with 342-USAF-11051A) at the NARA at College Park, MD, of which 80 can be viewed 
online at NARA’s Web pages (as of April 6, 2017).  
8 For example, Barnouw, 1982 & 1988; Furukawa; Nornes, 1996 & 2003; Mitchell; Oya, 2011 & 2012.  
9 There is no record of a motion picture project in the USSBS European Survey. Beveridge, European & 
Pacific. The National Archives holds 12 reels of motion pictures from the USSBS European Survey; 
however, they were those confiscated from Germany by the USSBS. See, “243.2 Records of the United 
States Strategic Bombing Survey [USSBS]”and “A Finding Aid to Audiovisual Records in the National 
Archives of the United States Relating to World War II.  
10 For the study of making war films by Hollywood in cooperation with the armed forces, see Koppes & 
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Among those who contributed to the production of such films were anonymous 
cameramen who risked their lives to film front-line combat scenes. McGovern was one 
of them. History attests that he happened to play a crucial role in recording the effects of 
the atomic bomb and preserving the record, whatever the original intention and 
purposes were behind the footage. 
It is an irony of history that these intentions—while they might be also partly 
responsible for the suppression of the films—and the conjuncture of other 
circumstances during the war led to the creation of these extraordinary records of the 
first and so far the last use of the atomic bomb in combat in human history.11 
 
 
2. McGovern Becomes Military Cameraman 
McGovern was born in Carrickmacross, Ireland, in 1909. He migrated to the 
United States with his family in 1922 when Southern State of Ireland won independence 
from the United Kingdom, an event that forced his father, a policeman for the British 
crown, out of the country. He was 12 when the family moved to New York.  
As a young boy, McGovern was interested in movies and started filmmaking, 
using a 16-mm hand-cranked camera when he was 17. That summer, he participated in 
a Citizens Military Training Camp (CMTC),12 a month-long military training program 
run by the US Army, and successfully completed all the requirements to become a 
reserve officer candidate after four summers of training. He joined the New York 
National Guard in 1934, after his application was turned down for a special 
photographic guard position in the Army’s elite 102nd Observation Squadron based in 
Staten Island. He was accepted by the Squadron in 1937 as a corporal and was inducted 
in 1940.13 
Late in 1942, McGovern was assigned to the First Motion Picture Unit 
                                                                                                                                       
Black; Suid. For the study of making films by armed forces with the cooperation of the Hollywood film 
makers, see Vincent; Maslowski; Cunningham. 
11 Needless to say, the footage would not have had to be taken if the atomic bomb was not used in the first 
place. 
12 The provisions for the voluntary training were prescribed in the National Defense Act of 1920 to 
compensate for the universal military training that was not made compulsory by the law. The programs were 
held each summer from 1921 to 1940 when the selective service act of 1940 was introduced. For CMTC, see 
Donald M. Kington, Forgotten Summers: The Story of the Citizens’ Military Training Camps, 1921-1940, 
San Francisco, CA: 1995; John Garry Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp 
Movement, 1913-1920, Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1972. 
13 U. S. Air Force Oral History with Lieutenant Colonel Daniel A. McGovern, Air Forces Historical 
Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, AL (Hereafter, “AFHRA”), 1-9, 16-18 
(Hereafter, “Oral History”). 
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(FMPU) to become an instructor to train combat cameramen. By then he had become a 
seasoned cameraman, working for the 16th Photographic Squadron Special based at 
Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C. that was in charge of filming VIPs. His last 
job at the base was to film the arrival of President Fulgencio Batista of Cuba on 
December 8, 1942.14  
The FMPU was established in July 1942 by the AAF as a unit independent of 
the Army’s counterpart to produce its own motion pictures and still photos. The AAF 
was rapidly expanding that year with a planned production of 65,000 aircraft and 
needed 100,000 crewmembers to man the planes. In April 1942, AAF Commander 
Henry H. Arnold invited Jack L. Warner, vice president of Warner Brothers, who was 
also his personal friend, to Washington and asked for his cooperation. It was the time of 
college graduation—a great opportunity for the armed forces to recruit volunteers, and 
many of the nation’s universities had advanced their commencements a month in view 
of the graduates’ enlistment—and Arnold wanted to make the most of this opportunity.15 
In two months, Warner Brothers made a film Winning Your Wings, featuring 
then popular actor James Stewart. Thousands of young Americans who watched the 
film joined the AAF, and it had also become the urgent task for the FMPU to produce 
films to help train these recruits.16 
The FMPU soon started its task at Warner Brothers’ Vitagraph Studio in Los 
Angeles. After the studio grew overcrowded with the staff, the unit moved to Hull 
Loach Studio in Culver City near Hollywood in October 1942, and started to produce 
training films on requests from AAF’s various departments.17 The first of these films 
was Learn and Live (1943), which taught crewmen on how to avoid and survive 
airplane crash accidents. The FMPU also made such films as Recognition of the 
Japanese Zero Fighter (1943) that told how to discern their own P-40 fighters from the 
Japanese Zero, which shared similar characteristics with P-40s, and Resisting Enemy 
Interrogation (1944) that taught how to behave during interrogation by the enemy if 
captured and made prisoners of war. The FMPU produced 238 films in three years until 
1945, with a total run time of 88 hours and 27 minutes.18 
In the meantime, Combat Camera Units (CCU) were established within the 
FMPU in November 1942, in order to shoot actual battles from the air, and the FMPU 
                                                     
14 Ibid., 19-27; “Batista Is Feted on Capital Visit,” New York Times, Dec. 9, 1942, 14. 
15 Cunningham, 96, 105-107; Vincent, 11-15; Koppes & Black, 78. 
16 Cunningham, 105-107.  
17 Vincent, 24.  
18 Vincent, 33-34, 112, 116, 131; Richard Dyer MacCann, 165; Cunningham, 96.  
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started to train CCU’s would-be cameramen. The training of aerial shootings took 
six-week in Las Vegas for combat cameramen after an 11-week lecture course at the 
Culver City Studio.19 Fourteen CCUs were organized by the end of 1944, of which 12 
were sent overseas; the Ninth CCU was the first unit to be sent when it traveled to 
North Africa to film battles in Operation Torch that was launched in November 1942.20 
Footage taken by the CCU cameramen was used in various films, newsreels, 
and magazines, as well as newspapers, just like still photos and motion pictures taken 
by civilian photographers. Those battle scenes shot by the CCU cameramen were often 
used in films produced by professional directors from Hollywood, who were now 
working for the FMPC.21 
In June 1943 McGovern was sent to Europe as a combat photographer. He was 
assigned to the Eighth CCU and shot battles fought by the AAF’s Eighth Air Force 
based in London. The footage he shot was used in such films as the Memphis Bell: A 
Story of a Flying Fortress (1944) by William Wyler (then an AAF major) and Combat 
America (1945) featuring actor Clark Gable (then an AAF lieutenant) and Target for 
Today (1943).22 
The Memphis Bell is the story of a B-17 heavy bomber and its crew who were 
on their way to completing their 25th mission, after which they were to return to the US.  
Their last mission comes as a critical moment for the crew as the injury rate per sortie in 
a battle with the German Luftwaffe was at least five percent. It was calculated that only 
one third of aircraft would survive after 20 missions.23  
CCU photographers shared their fate with the aircraft and the crew, as they 
flew as part of the crew. While some photographers received medals for also shooting 
down enemy airplanes, others got killed as their airplanes were shot down.24  
McGovern survived two crashes, although he was badly injured; he returned to 
the US in the spring of 1944 and hospitalized in a rehabilitation center. After his 
recovery, McGovern was assigned to a position of a public relations officer; however, 
he arranged to come back to the FMPC in Culver City as he missed the job of a 
cameraman. He spent two months prior to the end of the war in the Mariana’s Saipan 
and Tinian as part of the 11th CCU, shooting pictures for The Last Bomb (1947) being 
                                                     
19 Vincent, 29-31 
20 Maslowski, 157-158, 199.  
21 Ibid., 26-31. 
22 Oral History, 30. They were all produced by the FMPU. 
23 Maslowski, 160. A limited tour of duty was ultimately raised to 30.  
24 Ibid., 182; Vincent, 31-32. 
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produced under the director Frank Lloyd, then an AAF major.25 
The CCUs’ focus shifted with the change in the emphasis of the AAF’s 
strategies from the recruitment and production of training films to the recording of their 
battles, which started in the summer of 1944.26 It was considered that the motion 
picture history “will make it possible to set forth in the fullest manner the part played by 
the Air Forces in the present conflict…factually and irrefutably…”27  
In the summer of 1943, military officials initiated planning for their postwar 
reorganization, which would feature unification of the armed forces to promote 
economy and efficiency. Anticipating the reduction of the military budget, it was a 
question at stake for each branch of the armed forces, Army, Navy and Army Air Forces, 
to determine how big a slice of pie they would get after the war. The competition was 
especially fierce between the AAF, who had been seeking to be independent from the 
Army, and the Navy, who was afraid of losing its vested interest to the rising air force.28      
Against such a backdrop, the AAF intended these motion pictures to be their 
weapon to win the heart of people in the Congress, White House, and civilian groups.29 
These films would eventually play a role in persuading the policy makers that the 
country’s air arm should be given an independent status when the National Security Act 
of 1947 was enacted.30 
 
3. Making of the First Atomic Bomb Films 
When the war finally came to an end, McGovern was ordered to be one of the 
first photographers to film Hiroshima and Nagasaki.31 He was told that it would be for 
a newsreel pool, which would be also used by the regular media. It was part of the 
STINKO Project, a press campaign organized by the United States Strategic Air Force 
(USSTAF) that was established in July 1945 to inflict a final blow on Japanese cities.32 
                                                     
25 Oral History, 36-38, 56-57, 115. 
26 Maslowski, 306. 
27 Letter to Major General L. S. Kuter from James P. Hodges (Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence), 
dated Nov. 16, 1944, Motion Picture History of Army Air Forces, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, 
AFHRA.  
28 Michael Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45, New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1977, 1-26; Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace 1943-1945, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, 5-7; Laurence J. Legere, Unification of the Armed Forces, NY: 
Garland Publishing, 1988, 239-240, 249-250; Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 
1943-1946, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962, 10-14. 
29 Maslowski, 32-33. 
30 Cunningham, 118.   
31 Oral History, 38. 
32 JCS 742/12, “Directive on the Establishment of U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces (USASTAF),” July 11, 
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After all, another photographer went to Hiroshima on Sept. 3, while McGovern visited 
Nagasaki on September 8 and 9, together with the correspondents of the press tour who 
visited Hiroshima five days earlier.33  
According to the personal papers and memoirs of the participants, or 
newspaper articles they wrote, the tour, consisting at first of seven journalists, left 
Washington, D.C. in late July 1945. McGovern and several other journalists likely 
joined the tour in Guam where it arrived in the middle of August after making stops at 
such cities as London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Cairo, and Bagdad, as well as Calcutta, 
Chongqing, and Manila. They entered Japan from Atsugi, Kanagawa Prefecture—the 
point of landing during the occupation of the country—on August 30. The group visited 
Hiroshima by motor vehicles provided by the Japanese Navy at Kure, at which airstrip 
they landed their B-17 from Atsugi.34 
In Hiroshima, the correspondents walked around the city center, trying to find 
Japanese citizens along the way who witnessed the bombing, and had a conference with 
a representative of the local Japanese military police and the Japanese press. In 
Nagasaki, they visited a POW camp where they talked with a Dutch doctor, and walked 
around Ground Zero.35 In the six-minutes of black-and-white footage McGovern 
shot—the only footage taken in the STINKO Project discovered—we can see a scene of 
rubble of the demolished city and apparently Dutch or Australian POWs with severe 
burns that they suffered when they were exposed to the atomic ray while being 
mobilized to work at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipbuilding.36 
Following the visit to Nagasaki, McGovern and the correspondents traveled to 
                                                                                                                                       
1945, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1: 1942‐1945, The Pacific Theater, Reel 1, Paul Kesaris, ed., 
University Publication of America, Frederick, MD, 1981; Craven and Cate, 676-702, 733.  
33 From 1st Lt. Daniel A. McGovern to G-2 Section, USSBS, “Motion Picture Coverage of Japan by Army 
Air Force,” Nov. 13, 1945, Role No. 53, USSBS RSR. 
34 These papers, memoirs and articles include; “War Correspondents’ Trip,” 1945, Folder 2, Box 10; “The 
Flying Circus,” Folder 8, Box 8, both in Vern Haugland Papers, at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Library, 
University of Montana at Missoula; Clark Lee, One Last Look Around, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 
1947; Bill Laurence, Six Presidents, Too Many Wars: The 40-Year Memoirs of a Washington Correspondent, 
New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972; “What the Atom Bomb Did to Hiroshima: ‘Most Terrible 
Destruction in World,’” PM, Sept. 4, 1945, p. 5; Homer Bigart, “A Month After the Atom Bomb: Hiroshima 
Still Can’t Believe It,” New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 5, 1945, 1, 8. See also, Shigesawa, 2010, 20-29. 
35 Shigesawa, 2010, 28-29, 69-70, 76. 
36 The author found the footage at the National Archives in April 2010. “STINKO,” Motion Picture Films 
from the “Combat Subjects” Program Series, ca. 1939-ca. 1945, RG 18, NARA at College Park. She is 
grateful for the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum for identifying places that appear in the video. According 
to NARA’s Motion Pictures and Sound Recording (hereafter, MPSR), the Nagasaki footage was transferred 
to the facilities from the Wright-Patterson Air Base in August 1963 along with 95 titles (276 reels) of battle 
footage filmed during World War II. No restriction was set then. Email answer from MPSR to the author, 
May 13, 2013.  
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the Korean Peninsula on September 10 to cover a special ceremony celebrating the 
country’s independence from Japan. Then they returned to Tokyo the next day and 
made it in time to capture some scenes of the aborted suicide by former Prime Minister 
Hideki Tojo. McGovern then continued to film places and events in Tokyo, Yokohama, 
and Atsugi before visiting Kyoto from September 15-19.37  
The STINKO Project inspired McGovern as a cameraman. While other war 
photographers and soldiers returned home to the US after they were discharged from the 
military, McGovern sought to stay in Japan to continue filming. When Lieutenant 
Colonel John R. McCrary,38 PR officer of the press tour, asked him if he would 
continue with the press tour to China and Southeast Asia, McGovern declined, saying 
that he wanted to stay in Japan to work on a story that had to be told.39 
In an effort to seek extension of his stay in Japan—he only had permission for 
a one-month stay—McGovern visited Major General Orvil A. Anderson, Director of the 
USSBS Military Analysis Division and military advisor for the USSBS Chairman, at 
his office in Meiji Building in Tokyo. McGovern hoped that the former deputy 
commander for operations of the Eighth Air Force who was involved in the USSBS 
from the planning stage would somehow arrange to issue him a new order.40 
McGovern explained the situation he had faced—that he was doing the 
newsreel coverage for the news pool and working on the motion picture history of the 
AAF. Anderson asked him about the type of equipment he had. When McGovern told 
the general that there were sufficient equipment and film in Guam enough to last for a 
year, Anderson told him to go back to Guam to renew the order, as he would make 
arrangements to assign him to the USSBS.41  
By “film,” McGovern meant color film—both 16-millimeter and 
                                                     
37 From 1st Lt. Daniel A. McGovern to G-2 Section, USSBS, “Motion Picture Coverage of Japan by Army 
Air Force,” Nov. 13, 1945, Role No. 53, USSBS RSR. McGovern mentioned in his oral history that he was 
in Kyoto from Sept. 21-24 and in Atsugi, Tokyo and Yokohama from Sept. 25-30. Oral History, 88-92. 
38 Formerly the New York Daily Mirror’s chief editorial writer, McCrary joined the Army Air Corps (AAF’s 
predecessor) in 1942. He married actress Jinx Falkenburg in 1945 and the couple became famous for their 
radio and TV talk shows after the war. A political strategist, McCrary convinced Dwight D. Eisenhower to 
run for US President and contributed to his victory in the election. As a publicist, he was best known for 
fixing “kitchen debate” between Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Nikita S. 
Khrushchev in 1959. Richard Severo, “Tex McCrary Dies at 92; Public Relations Man Who Helped Create 
Talk-Show Format,” New York Times, July 30, 2003, C12. 
39 Oral History, 59-60. 
40 Oral History, 59-62; Beveridge, European, 96-97. 
41 Oral History, 61-62. He had actually arranged to have hundreds of color film roles and other equipment to 
be sent from Guam. USSBS Outgoing Message, Oct. 25, 1945, Folder: 664 Outgoing Message (USASTAF), 
October 1945 [2 of 2], Box 150, RG 243. 
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35-millimeter.42 For the Army during World War II, filming with 35-millimeter 
black-and-white was the standard. That changed for the AAF in early 1945 when its 
commander Arnold saw the Navy’s The Fighting Lady, produced in 1944 by a popular 
director Edward Steichen. Arnold was stunned by the impact of beautiful color images.  
How shocked and upset AAF leaders were for finding that they had fallen 
behind the Navy is obvious in the following account written by Lt. General Barney M. 
Giles, Chief of the Air Staff. 
 
“It is a crime that we have no comparable color pictures of Regensburg, 
Schweinfurt, Gotha, Zeitz, and those other spectacular strikes of the heavies; of the 
Tactical Air Forces’ massacre of 22-25 January; of the thousands of fighters kills 
and strafings [sic] scored by the Eighth and Ninth during this past year of Big 
League operations. Such pictures would enable us to show the country in 
convincing fashion something of the damage we have done to the heart and guts of 
Germany and which precipitated her military collapse—something of the part our 
airmen have played in the actual battles on the ground.”43 
 
In a desperate attempt to catch up with the Navy, the AAF was set to produce 
color motion pictures.44 They mobilized a number of cameramen and a large amount of 
16-millimeter Kodachrome film for four Special Film Projects—No. 186 on war against 
Germany and Nos. 193, 194 and 195 on the war against Japan. However, with the 
sudden end of war in August 1945, three of them were canceled. While 120,000 feet of 
film was exposed for No. 186, they were never put together to be shown to the public, 
and Nos. 194 and 195 were never initiated. The only project that came to fruition was 
No. 193, which became The Last Bomb, depicting the successful strategic bombings of 
Japan by B-29s, including the two by atomic bombs.45 What McGovern referred to as 
the stock in excess in Guam were those left unused due to the cancellation of the 
Special Projects Nos. 194 and 195.46 
                                                     
42 Oral History, 61. 
43 Letter to Hoyt S. Vandenberg from Giles, Feb. 1, 1945, Folder: H.S.V.—Personal 1944-1945, Box 77, 
Hoyt. S. Vandenberg Papers, LC. 
44 Maslowski, 56-60, 213-217. 
45 Ibid., 60-61. McGovern’s Oral History says, ““Last Bomb Production” was canceled” (p. 61), but all the 
available sources tell of its completion. See, for example, “Atomic Bomb Film is Made in Color,” New York 
Times, October 23, 1946, 48.   
46 History of 18th Army Air Force Base Unit (Motion Picture Unit), Culver City, California, August 1 
through August 31, 1945, AFHRA, 6. The official USSBS historian also confirmed this when he wrote that 
“A large supply of color film had been obtained on Guam, as it had been collected for use by the AAF and 
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Returning from Guam, McGovern was assigned to the USSBS’s Physical 
Damage Division47 and left Tokyo for Nagasaki on November 1 together with three 
other division members, including Dan B. Dyer, a civilian target analysis specialist.48 
There is little record in his Oral History of his activities during the month of October 
other than that he went back to Guam to have his order extended, but it is likely that 
McGovern had revisited Nagasaki before this November assignment and that he came 
to know Nichiei’s project at this time.49  
A government-controlled documentary film company established in 1940 
during the Sino-Japanese War,50 Nichiei started filming the aftermath of the atomic 
bombings since late September as part of a research party organized by the Japanese 
Ministry of Education.51 The crew, however, had been ordered to suspend their 
                                                                                                                                       
not used because of the sudden end of the war, and it had been decided to use this to photograph and 
illustrate Survey activities.” Beveridge, Pacific, 124. 
47 The division, one of 15 USSBS study divisions operated in Japan, was to survey the extents of damages 
caused by bombings on buildings and other structures, and consisted of 150 persons in 15 teams that were 
sent to various cities across Japan. Beveridge, Pacific, 116, 125-126. 
48 He was assigned as a photo interpreter to the PDD’s Photo Interpretation Section as of Nov. 26. Personnel 
Order No. 12, Nov. 26, 1945, Folder: 300.4-F Personnel Order, Box 12, RG 243. Operation Order No. 41, 
Oct. 30, 1945, Folder: 300.4-E Orders-Operations (USSBS) Tokyo, Box 12, RG 243; Beveridge, Pacific, 68, 
124.  
49 Oral History, 93; Entry of Oct. 17, 1945, Work Diary, Papers of Hidetsugu Aihara, Hiroshima Peace 
Memorial Museum. It is difficult to confirm this fact, however, as another document mention he was flying 
from Guam to Atsugi on this day. “First Lt McGovern will arrive courier plane tail number 552. ETA 1700, 17 
October, Atsugi Air Base with 1000 pounds photographic equipment.” Incoming Message from COMGEM 
USASTAF to USASTAF ADVON ATT G-4 USSASB Tokyo, undated, Folder: 664-Outgoing Message 
(USASTAF) October 1945, Box 151, RG 243. 
50 Started as Nihon News Sha (Japan News Corporation), which combined news film units of three 
newspaper companies of Asahi, Mainichi and Yomiuri, and Domei news agency in April 1940, it changed its 
name to Nihon Eiga Sha in May 1941. Uryu, 1977, 520-521. 
51 Personal memoirs published by Nichiei producers speak of the launch of their filming as independent 
action that came from their professional urge to record the first-ever use of the atomic bomb on cities. 
However, declassified GHQ documents or contemporary military memorandums all point out that they were 
under the research party assigned by the Education Ministry and the film itself supports this as it recorded the 
activities of the scientists. I am inclined to believe that the unit worked under the research party because the 
declassified papers say the Japanese government was “to pay all expenses incurred till prohibition by 
American command.” (American authorities to pay all expenses thereafter and royalties for the film.) There 
is no record found that proves that Nichiei actually received the payments. However, there is no reason to 
believe otherwise when everything else was conducted as noted in the documents. “Estimate” by K. Negishi 
(Nichiei) for commanding officer, USSBS, Dec. 7, 1945; Request for continued investigation, Dec. 19, 1045; 
“Atomic Bomb,” a Memo to Lt. Ehlers, Jan. 22, 1946; “Atomic Bomb Film,” a memorandum for record by 
Press, Pictorial and Broadcast Division, Jan. 28, 1946, all in Folder: Atomic Bomb Films, Box 8578, RG 331 
(microfilm collected by National Diet Library in Japan, by courtesy of Shugakukan Research Library, 
Ritsumeikan University); also, “Documentary Atomic Bombing Film,” a memorandum to Akira Iwasaki 
(Nichiei) from USSBS, Jan. 11, 1946; Statement of the Production Cost on “Effects of Atomic Bomb,” Dec. 
17, 1945, both in the Daniel A. McGovern Collection. The author would like to thank Dr. Nornes for 
opening to the public his important [Daniel A. McGovern Collection] in the Web pages of the Center for 
Japanese Studies, University of Michigan. Japanese filmmakers’ personal memoirs include: Kano, 274-278; 
Iwasaki, 96-99. 
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operation by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers (GHQ/SCAP) after one of its cameramen was found filming in Nagasaki by the 
occupation forces on Oct. 17, 1945.52  
By then the Japanese filmmakers had taken 26,000-feet of film. The 
GHQ/SCAP’s Civil Information and Education Section (CIE) wanted the film seized by 
the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) of the GHQ/SCAP’s Civil Intelligence Section 
(CIS) because it “might be inflammatory if shown to the general public” and that it was 
“objectionable from a security or public safety viewpoint” to have the film completed 
by the Japanese.53 However, McGovern, together with the Surgeon General’s Office 
and NavTechJap (Naval Technical Mission to Japan), both of which were then 
conducting research on the effects of the atomic bomb, arranged to have the Japanese 
party complete the film under his supervision and have the completed film be sent to the 
Army Medical Museum in Washington, D.C.54 In a memorandum addressed to the G-2 
section of the USSBS military affairs division, McGovern said: 
 
“Inasmuch as the work of the Japanese research party and Japanese motion picture 
group was accomplished prior to the entrance into Hiroshima and Nagasaki of 
American research teams, the Japanese film and their factual findings are 
considered… to be inestimable value to agencies in the United States which are 
concerned with the development of atomic energy and its military and economic 
application.”55 
 
After spending some two weeks in Nagasaki, McGovern returned to Tokyo and 
officially established the Motion Picture Project on December 7.56 A memorandum he 
wrote on USS Barr, which the USSBS was using as its headquarters and 
accommodation in Nagasaki, describes the two phases of the project—one that “will 
                                                     
52 Oral History, 60; Entries of Oct. 17, Nov. 12, 13, 1945, Work Diary, Papers of Hidetsugu Aihara. Nornes 
says it was Oct. 24 when the cameraman was found by the military police. Nornes, 1996, 122-128. 
53 “Atomic Bomb Film,” a memorandum for record by Press, Pictorial and Broadcast Division, Jan. 28, 
1946, Folder: Atomic Bomb Films, Box 8578, RG 331.  
54 “Japanese Motion Picture Film of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” from Daniel A. McGovern to Lt. 
Commander Woodward, USSBS G-2, dated Dec. 29, 1945, 1; Memorandum, Subject: Atomic Bomb 
Motion Picture Project, Jan. 3, 1946, both in the [Daniel A. McGovern Collection]. 
55 “Japanese Motion Picture Film of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” from Daniel A. McGovern to Lt. 
Commander Woodward, USSBS G-2, dated Dec. 29, 1945, 1. [Daniel A. McGovern Collection]   
56 McGovern was assigned as Director of Photography and Production and Officer in Charge of the USSBS 
Motion Picture Project. Personnel Order No. 16, Dec. 7, 1945, Folder: 300.4-F Personnel Order, Box 12, RG 
243. 
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bring to the public an objective picture of life in Japan as it exists today,” and the other 
“designed to record the physical damage inflicted upon Japan and also to document 
certain important technological aspects of the Japanese war economy.”57 It was planned 
that this motion picture be released at the same time that the USSBS in Japan would 
present its final report.58 
McGovern left again for Nagasaki on January 5, 1946, in a five-car steam 
locomotive with a Pullman, which would be their headquarters and accommodations, 
and all the equipment. The team then consisted of 11 officers and enlisted men.59 
According to Akira “Harry” Mimura, a Japanese cameraman who was educated in the 
US and worked in Hollywood in prewar years, there were ten members, including a 
Japanese cook and two pages, when he joined the team in February upon request by 
McGovern, while other cameramen returned to the US one after another as they were 
demobilized.60 
Nichiei resumed their filming in Nagasaki in late December. The USSBS 
Motion Picture Project, on the other hand, toured Kyushu and Chugoku regions after 
completing filming Nagasaki early February, and then stayed in Hiroshima from the 
middle of March until April 24. Then they visited Osaka, Takarazuka, and Kyoto before 
returning to Tokyo on April 29.61 McGovern in the meantime moved back and forth 
between the team and Tokyo, where Nichiei was editing their footage after returning 
from Nagasaki. He also traveled to Kagoshima, where he filmed the eruption of the 
Sakurajima mountain from the air on March 20, and to Tsuruga and Kobe in May.62  
The filming phase of the Motion Picture Project was completed by the time the 
members came back to Tokyo on June 7. McGovern and his crew returned to 
Washington, D.C. through Guam and Kwajalein Atoll, where the Operation 
Crossroad—atomic bomb tests—were being conducted, Hawaii and San Francisco.63 
The color films were sent to Hollywood to be processed.64 
                                                     
57 “Function of PDD #10,” a memorandum to G-2 Section, USSBS, dated Nov. 17, 1945, Role No. 53, 
USSBS RSR. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Oral History, 66; “Personnel Order No. 16, U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Dec. 7, 1945,” Folder: 
300.4-F Personnel Order, Box 12, RG 243; Beveridge, Pacific, 124-125. 
60 Kudo, 1985, 181; Roger Pulvers, “Akira ‘Harry’ Mimura: A life uniquely focused on both sides of the 
Pacific,” Japan Times, Jan. 8, 2012, 5. 
61 Oya, 2011, 29. 
62 Oral History, 107-118. 
63 Oral History, 119-121.  
64 Oral History, 123. 
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The Japanese film was supposed to be completed by March 1.65 However, the 
schedule was delayed due to bad weather.66 The Japanese film was completed on April 
21 and a preview was held in Tokyo on May 4 for a small group of parties involved in 
the production.67 Its 35mm negative and positive projection print were then shipped out 
on May 6 and May 23, respectively, by air and received by the AAF’s Motion Picture 
Service Division in Washington, D.C. on May 28 and June 18, respectively.68 Nichiei 
producers, in the meantime, took the risk of secretly making a rush print of the film for 
them to keep, which did not have a soundtrack.69  
 
4. Atomic Bomb Films Suppressed 
The films that McGovern was so eager to create and to take home to the US 
hardly made it to the theaters in the United States as he hoped. Both Nichiei’s 
black-and-white film and Motion Picture Project’s color footage were classified, after 
all. According to McGovern, when the Nichiei’s edited film was screened at the Navy’s 
Science Laboratory in Anacostia, Maryland, the Army’s Manhattan Engineer District, 
which developed the atomic bomb, raised an objection to showing the film to the 
general public, saying that it included confidential information—i.e., the heights the 
bomb exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.70  
In an attempt to protect the film from the possible destruction, McGovern 
secretly produced two 16-millimeter copies of the Nichiei film, which he asked to be 
placed in the custody of the Wright-Patterson Air Field in Dayton, Ohio. While 
whereabouts of the original film had come to be known only in 1994, the copied films 
McGovern produced had eventually been transferred to the National Archives in 1967.71  
                                                     
65 “Documentary Atomic Bombing Film,” a memorandum to Akira Iwasaki (Nichiei) from USSBS, Jan. 11, 
1946, in the [Daniel A. McGovern Collection]. 
66 Incoming cablegrams from Tokyo to War Department on March 16, 20, 27, 1946, Folder: 664 
Cablegrams (Incoming) Pacific 1946 Jan.-Oct., Box 150, RG 243. 
67 Entries of April 21 & May 4, 1946, Work Diary, Papers of Hidetsugu Aihara; Kano, 276. 
68 Incoming cablegram from USSBS Motion Picture Project to War Department to Motion Picture Service 
Division, AAF, May 7, 1946; Incoming message from CG, PACUSA Tokyo to Motion Picture Service 
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69 Nornes, 1996, 131. 
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The planned production of a documentary from the USSBS color films came to 
a standstill when Warner Brothers told McGovern that “the war is over now… we’re no 
longer working for the government.”72 The footage was classified soon after the US 
Atomic Energy Commission was established.73  It was declassified by 1961 and 
transferred to the National Archives in 1962.74 
The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki examines the damages 
caused by the bomb from scientific points of view. Its physical damage sections, in particular, 
detail the method to calculate the heights at which the bombs had been detonated, with some 
graphical data and scenes of scientists making measurements. It is not hard to understand why 
the US government wanted to classify the film. The color footage from Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki of the USSSBS Motion Picture Project, on the other hand, consists of pictures of 
mostly people and structures—so vivid and painful that it is often disturbing to watch—but 
does not contain any confidential information. Why, then, did the US government classify this 
material? 
Suppression of films and literature on the atomic bomb to a large extent has 
been discussed in numerous preceding studies.75 The conclusions of these studies can 
be categorized into three patterns; one that concerns security, another that concerns the 
Japanese as the subject of the occupation, and a third that concerns America’s reputation. 
For the security, secrecy about technical information on the atomic bomb was 
maintained on all fronts. At the Japanese front during the occupation, censors of the 
SCAP’s Civil Censorship Detachment often suppressed references to the atomic bomb 
as an element that might disturb the public tranquility. This also involved an intention to 
suppress any attacks on the use of the atomic bomb from the Japanese for propaganda 
purposes.76 As for the American reputation, expressions on the atomic bomb were 
censored out of fear that the material would give “the impression that the United States was 
inhumane or barbaric in using it.”77  
Suppression of information regarding the atomic bomb in the US also 
                                                                                                                                       
Force (hereafter, DAF), to Audio Visual Branch, NARA, Sept. 19, 1967. The film was transferred as an 
accretion to the color footage that was transferred five years earlier. Oral History, 123; Nornes, 1996, 133, 
152-153 (notes 33, 35). 
72 Oral History, 123-124.  
73 It was sometime around March 1947 that it was classified. Mitchell, Atomic Cover-Up, 50-52. 
74 “Offer to Transfer Film Records to the National Archives,” from Directorate of Administrative Services, 
DAF, to Wayne C. Grover, Archivist of the United States, NARA, Sept. 15, 1961; Accession Inventory, Feb. 
21, 1962, both by courtesy of MPSR.  
75 For example, Mayo, 1984; Braw, 1991. 
76 Mayo, 311; Braw, 89-142.  
77 Braw, 133. 
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concerned the American public. McGovern believed that the films were suppressed 
“because of the horror, the devastation…The medical effects were pretty gory… One of 
the most terrible things was the body burns… The attitude was: Do not show any 
medical effects. Don’t make people sick.”78 He also mentioned that “[t]hey didn’t want 
the general public to know what their weapons had done—at a time they were planning 
on more bomb tests. …we didn’t want the material out because … we were sorry for 
our sins.”79  
When we talk about the domestic concerns in the US, we should also note 
circumstances surrounding the political and military landscapes of the time. Before the 
atomic bomb was embraced as a decisive, revolutionary weapon, which brought Japan 
to her knees,80 government and military leaders often downplayed the horrific effects of 
the atomic bomb, treating it as just another bomb.81 Behind such a narrative was likely 
the competition among armed forces and the fear of the possible resurgence of the 
isolationist sentiment that was strong among the public before the war.  
In addition to the unification of the armed forces, President Harry S. Truman 
planned to introduce universal military training (UMT) following the end of the war, which 
would require all qualified citizens to serve for a period of reserve duty.82 In the congressional 
hearing in February 1946, opponents of the plan often pronounced that the atomic bomb had 
rendered the UMT unnecessary.83 While such a discussion threatened the possible legislation 
of the UMT, military leaders tried to belittle the role of the atomic bomb in the US arsenal.84 
This has also complicated the argument for the reorganization and unification of the armed 
forces, as the competition between the Army, Navy, and AAF for the postwar size and budget 
seemed to be now joined by the atomic bomb.85 The atomic bomb was officially posing a 
                                                     
78 Mitchell, 50. 
79 Ibid., 53-54. 
80 Most famously, this narrative is found in Henry L. Stimson, “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” 
Harper’s Magazine, Vol. 194, No. 1161 (February 1947), 105. 
81 Those who had this type of mindset, at least for some time after the war, include Secretary of War Robert 
P. Patterson and Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall. For this discussion, see, Shigesawa, 2016, 52-63; 
Frank A. Settle, Jr., George C. Marshall and the Atomic Bomb, Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2016. 
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84 See, Hearings, Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 79th Congress, 1st Session (Nov. 
8, 13, 15-16, 19-21, 26-30, Dec. 3, 6-7, 10-14, 17-19, 1945) on H. R. 515. 
85 Possibly out of such a fear, Marshall warned army officers that “legislation for the establishment of a 
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problem. 
The Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) on August 18, 1945, to study the possible effects of the atomic bomb on modern 
warfare, saying that “The development of the atomic bomb presents far-reaching 
implications and problems…It is desirable that a concerted viewpoint of the military on 
the over-all effect of this new weapon on warfare and military organization be 
developed as soon as possible...”86 The first draft report prepared by the JCS’s Joint 
Strategic Survey Committee regarding the inquiry on October 30, 1945, contained the 
following statement: 
 
“Widespread discussion of the atomic bomb has created a popular belief that the 
advent of the bomb renders obsolescent [sic] the roles of ground, naval and air 
forces as we now know them. Every appropriate step should be taken to correct this 
popular misconception. Lest it develop to proportions prejudicial to national 
security.”87  
 
 In such a circumstance, the atomic bomb films that depict vividly the reality of the 
effects of the atomic bomb should have understandably been suppressed.  
By the time its members left Japan for the US in December 1945, USSBS had 
apparently lost its interest in the motion pictures.88 Five education films from the USSBS 
color footage were produced, though, for Air University in Montgomery, Alabama, after 
                                                                                                                                       
single department of the armed forces is in no way connected with the bill before Congress in connection 
with universal military training.” Memorandum to General H. H. Arnold from George C. Marshall, Chief of 
Staff, Oct. 29, 1945, Folder: Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945 Unification, Box 51, Hoyt S. Vandenberg Papers, LC. 
Almost identical account can be found in the “memorandum for General and Special Staff: War Department 
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Hon. H. Struve Hensel, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Nov. 29, 1945, Hearings, Senate Committee on 
Military Affairs, 79th Congress, 1st Session on S. 84 & S. 1482, 473. 
86 JCS/1477, “Over-all Effect of Atomic Bomb on Warfare and Military Organization,” Memorandum by 
the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, dated Aug. 18, 1945, 1, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Microfilm), Part 2: 
1946-1953, Strategic Issues: Section 1, Reel 1. 
87 JCS 1477/1, Over-all effect of atomic bomb on warfare and military organization, Reference JCS 1477, 
Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Oct. 30, 1945, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(microfilm), Part 2: 1946-1953, Strategic Issues: Section 1 Reel 1. 
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the AAF’s Headquarters approved the plan in October 1946.89 Why the Presidential 
committee did not see the project through to the end is an enigma of history. We have to 
remember, however, what brought about the USSBS Motion Picture Project. It all started 
with an AAF’s ambition to display its air power. McGovern had likely kept this purpose in 
mind as he directed the project—regardless of what his own motivation was—as he was 
working under Anderson, who was one of the most vocal air power proponents of the time.90 
It was inherently an AAF project. 
McGovern’s direct involvement with the USSBS Motion Picture Project ended 
with the completion of the five training films, but it did not end his connection with the 
atomic bomb. After his service in the Korean War, McGovern was assigned in 1954 to 
the Look Out Mountain Air Base where he was placed in charge of recording—filming 
and editing the films of—nuclear tests in the Pacific and Nevada.91 
 
5. Legacy of the Atomic Bomb Films 
Of all the color films taken by the USSBS Motion Picture Project, those of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki—which account for one third of the entire collection—have 
been used in such documentary features as The Atomic Café (1982),92 Original Child 
Bomb (2004),93 and White Light Black Rain: The Destruction of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki (2007),94 and inspired such a fiction as The Day After (1983).95 Nichiei’s 
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91 Oral History, 142-148. 
92 Produced and directed by Kevin Rafferty, Pierce Rafferty and Jayne Loader. 
93 Directed by Carey Schonegevel. 
94 An HBO documentary film directed and produced by Steven Okazaki. 
95 A two-hour ABC documentary program written by Edward Hume and directed by Nicholas Meyer. 
Mitchell and Kudo suggest that the color footage of the USSBS Motion Picture Project were used in the film. 
However, the author could not identify any scenes in the film from the footage. A make-up designer of the 
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footage can be seen in Hiroshima Mon Amour (1959)96 and Hiroshima-Nagasaki: 
August 1945 (1970).97 It is difficult to gauge the impact they have had on the 
international society, but there is no doubt that they are one of a kind. Nothing could tell 
more graphically than these films of what happened and what can happen when nuclear 
war occurs.  
Abe Markus Nornes, Professor of Asian Cinema at the University of Michigan, 
says that the appropriations by other media turned Nichiei’s film “into the source for 
many of humanity’s images and icons for the atomic bomb attacks.”98 He argues that 
had the suppression of this film been successful, the images “would have been lost 
forever,”99 and then “every single film about the bombings would be different. More 
importantly, our very memory of the events would be radically altered.”100 
What Nornes meant by “suppression” is the attempted confiscation of the film 
that took place by the Surgeon General’s Office in early December 1945. He argues that 
there was a competition for control over the Japanese film between the Surgeon 
General’s Office and the USSBS. However, McGovern attributed his success to win the 
control over “certain intelligence facilities, the Army especially”101 to the Surgeon 
General’s Office. And as we saw above, it was GHQ/SCAP’s CIE that had actually 
wanted its Intelligence Corps to seize the film.102  
In his oral history, McGovern emphasizes that he saved the film.103 But even if 
he saved the film from the GHQ’s Intelligence Corps, the Japanese faced the same 
result, as they could not keep the film anyway.104 He did not save the film when it was 
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enter Hiroshima, and it is obvious the scenes of the ruins in the film had also been modeled after the 
devastations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the USSBS footage. Mitchell, 62; Lifton & Mitchell, 1995, 
373-374; Kudo, 9-12; Stephen Farber, “How a Nuclear Holocaust Was Staged for TV,” New York Times, Nov. 
13, 1983, H1, H34. 
96 Directed by French director Alain Resnais. The footage they used came from Nihon Eiga Shinsha, 
Nichiei’s successor, which inherited the rush print Nichiei producers hid from Americans. 
97 Produced by Erik Barnouw and funded by Museum of Modern Art Film Library. 
98 Nornes, 1996, 121. 
99 Ibid., 130. 
100 Ibid., 121. 
101 Oral History, 60-61, 63-65; Nornes, 1996, 122-128; “Japanese Motion Picture Film of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki,” from Daniel A. McGovern to Lt. Commander Woodward, USSBS G-2, dated Dec. 29, 1945, 1; 
Memorandum, Subject: Atomic Bomb Motion Picture Project, Jan. 3, 1946, both in the [Daniel A. 
McGovern Collection]. 
102 See, Note 51. 
103 Oral History, 63-65. 
104 We have to remember that it was arranged that the Americans would pay for the loyalties for the film, in 
addition to the expenses incurred to produce it. See Note 51 above. In fact, the phrase “turn over” replaced 
“confiscate” after the arrangement. We should not forget, however, that whatever legal action it was to 
purchase the film, it might have been done with an irresistible force that people of defeated nation could not 
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returned from the Office of Surgeon’s General to Nichiei, as the Office would obtain it 
later anyway. McGovern had the film returned to Nichiei because he would rather have 
it finished by the Japanese instead of having the film sent to the US unfinished. He was 
clear on this point: 
  
“In its present form this heterogeneous mass of photographic material is practically 
valueless...Several weeks will be required properly to edit, cut, caption this material 
in such a manner that it will have a scientific value as atomic bomb research material. 
The only individuals qualified to do this work are… the cameramen who, exposed 
the film, the individuals who were members of the Japanese research party…”105 
 
McGovern considered the film invaluable because “…the conditions under 
which it was taken would never be duplicated, until another atomic bomb is realeased 
[sic] under combat conditions…”106 As for the purpose of the Motion Picture Project in 
Japan, he noted that “[t]he main thing then was to get documentation before Japanese 
people had started reconstruction.”107 The footage was the symbol of destruction the 
airpower had inflicted. It had to have been taken as soon as possible, before any 
restoration of the city began. 
It is difficult to say whether our memory of the atomic horror would be 
radically different if we did not have the Nichiei film, as we have other forms of 
recordings; namely, photos, hand-painted pictures and testimonial accounts by survivors 
and bereaved ones, which have been accumulated over the last 70 years. The author, for 
example, is more familiar with the horrifying photos of people and buildings affected by 
the bomb, which were taken only days after the bombing by such Japanese 
photographers as Hajime Miyatake, Eiichi Matsumoto108 and Yosuke Yamahata.109 
There is no doubt, whatsoever, that we are fortunate to have both the black-and-white 
and color USSBS motion pictures. They are important witness of what the atomic bomb 
can do. 
                                                                                                                                       
refuse.   
105 “Japanese Motion Picture Film of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” from Daniel A. McGovern to Lt. 
Commander Woodward, USSBS G-2, dated Dec. 29, 1945. [Daniel A. McGovern Collection]  
106 “Japanese Motion Picture Film of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” From Daniel A. McGovern to Lt. 
Commander Woodward, USSBS G-2, dated Dec. 29, 1945, 1. [Daniel A. McGovern Collection]   
107 Oral History, 63. 
108 Miyatake and Matsumoto were photographers of the Asahi Shimbun. Their photos most famously 
appeared in the Aug. 6, 1952, issue of the Asahi Graph. 
109 A military cameraman who was ordered by the Army to take photos of Nagasaki for a propaganda 
purpose against the enemy. 
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On Dec. 14, 2016, the US Library of Congress named The Atomic Café as one of 
that year’s 25 additions to its National Film Registry, bringing the number of film titles 
earmarked for preservation by the library for their cultural, historical or aesthetical 
significance to 700.110 With the film, the footage taken by the USSBS Motion Picture Project 
will also live forever in American memory. 
 
6. Conclusion 
While much about STINKO Project is yet unknown, it had likely served as the 
parent of the USSBS Motion Picture Project, which created one of the most important records 
of the effects of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.   
The images might not have existed, however, if the conjuncture of 
circumstances had been aligned differently. As we have seen, the USSBS Motion 
Picture Project was not a planned endeavor but rather a result of a fortunate coincidence. 
If there were no competitions between the AAF and the Navy, there would have been 
no Special Film Projects.  If there were no Special Film Projects, there would have 
been no color films stored in the AAF bases in Guam, and that would mean no USSBS 
Motion Picture Project, and McGovern would not have been involved in the USSBS or 
the Nichiei project. And that would have definitely affected the fate of the Nichiei’s 
films, as well.  
Contrary to the original intention and purposes, the US Air Forces’ first atomic 
bomb films have become an indispensable tool for convincing citizens the world over 
of the inhumanity and insanity of nuclear weapons. While it would take another article 
to discuss to whom the films should belong, the subjects of the films—those nameless 
victims and survivors of the atomic bombings— certainly could not have told a lie 
about what they had suffered. 
Together with the Nichiei’s black-and-white film, the USSBS’s motion pictures 
are remembered as the symbol of America’s censorship of the atomic bomb. It may also 
be the time to remember them as the legacy of the brief period when the United States 
struggled to come to terms with the bomb.   
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